District Court, D. South Carolina — appointed by William Jefferson Clinton
Hartsock v. American Automobile Insurance
District Court, D. South Carolina · 2011-05-17 · cited 2×
The case involved a lawsuit by Theodore G. Hartsock, Jr. against American Automobile Insurance Company (AAIC) for bad faith and negligent claims handling after AAIC allegedly failed to respond to a demand for $1,000,000 in underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits under an excess policy following the 2010 death of the plaintiff's wife in a South Carolina car accident. AAIC moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that North Carolina law applied and that the claims were premature without a verdict exceeding prior liability payments in the underlying tort action. The court denied the motion, holding that South Carolina substantive law governed because the policy covered a vehicle registered in South Carolina and the accident occurred there, and that the action was not premature since the plaintiff had served AAIC with pleadings from the underlying tort suit as required by South Carolina Code section 38-77-160, allowing the insurer's good-faith duty to arise before a final judgment.
torts & liabilityprocedure
United States v. Narrl
District Court, D. South Carolina · 2011-04-27 · cited 2×
In United States v. Narrl, the defendant was charged with possessing heroin with intent to distribute and moved to suppress the drug evidence, arguing that police violated his Fourth Amendment rights by attaching a GPS tracking device to his vehicle without a warrant and using the resulting data to conduct a traffic stop and search. The district court denied the motion after finding that officers placed the device on the car while it was parked in public, tracked its movements only on public roads for about three weeks, and relied on the GPS data along with other observations to justify the stop and a subsequent canine sniff that alerted to narcotics. The court reasoned that Supreme Court precedent in United States v. Knotts established that monitoring a vehicle's travel on public streets does not constitute a search, even though it acknowledged contrary reasoning in United States v. Maynard and noted that South Carolina law provided a mechanism for obtaining a tracking warrant. The ruling followed Knotts as binding authority rather than extending privacy protections to prolonged GPS surveillance.
criminal lawprocedurecivil rights
Goode v. Astrue
District Court, D. South Carolina · 2010-08-16 · cited 1×
In Goode v. Astrue, the plaintiff challenged the Social Security Administration's denial of his application for disability insurance benefits, after an ALJ found that his impairments including coronary artery disease did not meet a listed impairment and that he could perform other work. The district court had previously remanded the case for further explanation by the ALJ but declined to award benefits outright. Plaintiff then sought attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, which the court denied. The court reasoned that the government's position was substantially justified because the ALJ had relied on the plaintiff's own statements about performing household chores and caring for a child to conclude he did not have serious limitations in daily activities, providing a reasonable basis in both fact and law even though additional explanation was required.
federal powerhealthcareprocedure
Gossett v. McMurtry
District Court, D. South Carolina · 2010-07-26
In Gossett v. McMurtry, the plaintiff sued the defendants for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and defamation after an incident during a fishing trip where he was pranked and photographs were taken and shared. The plaintiff sought to invoke the court's admiralty jurisdiction and strike the defendant's jury trial demand. The court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the incident did not satisfy the location and connection tests for admiralty jurisdiction over tort claims, as the publication occurred on land and the prank lacked potential to disrupt maritime commerce or a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. There was no other basis for federal jurisdiction.
proceduretorts & liabilityfederal power
SHERBY v. Astrue
District Court, D. South Carolina · 2010-07-14 · cited 4×
In this case, Joseph Sherby sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Social Security Commissioner's partial denial of his Disability Insurance Benefits claim, based on a back injury and spinal surgery that allegedly prevented work starting in 2003. An ALJ determined Sherby was disabled from September 2003 to July 2006 but found medical improvement thereafter allowing light work, leading to denial of ongoing benefits; the Appeals Council upheld this. The Magistrate Judge recommended reversal and remand, concluding the ALJ improperly relied only on the medical-vocational guidelines at step five despite nonexertional limitations from pain affecting concentration, which required vocational expert testimony instead. The district court adopted this recommendation, reversed the Commissioner's decision, and remanded for further proceedings, also noting a subsequent disability finding but declining to address additional objections as moot.
federal powerhealthcare
Figueroa v. Napolitano
District Court, D. South Carolina · 2010-07-13 · cited 1×
The case involved plaintiff Daryl Figueroa challenging his disqualification from a Customs and Border Protection officer position due to an age limit of 37, claiming it violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act after he applied as a veteran preference eligible. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, adopting the magistrate judge's recommendation. It held that 5 U.S.C. § 3307 expressly authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to set maximum entry ages for such positions, exempting the policy from ADEA coverage, and that the court lacked jurisdiction over any embedded VEOA claim because the plaintiff had not exhausted required administrative remedies under that statute. The dismissal was with prejudice as to the ADEA claim but without prejudice to separate VEOA or USERRA claims.
labor & employmentcivil rights