Patrick Michael Duffy

The case involved a lawsuit by Theodore G. Hartsock, Jr. against American Automobile Insurance Company (AAIC) for bad faith and negligent claims handling after AAIC allegedly failed to respond to a demand for $1,000,000 in underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits under an excess policy following the 2010 death of the plaintiff's wife in a South Carolina car accident. AAIC moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that North Carolina law applied and that the claims were premature without a verdict exceeding prior liability payments in the underlying tort action. The court denied the motion, holding that South Carolina substantive law governed because the policy covered a vehicle registered in South Carolina and the accident occurred there, and that the action was not premature since the plaintiff had served AAIC with pleadings from the underlying tort suit as required by South Carolina Code section 38-77-160, allowing the insurer's good-faith duty to arise before a final judgment.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In United States v. Narrl, the defendant was charged with possessing heroin with intent to distribute and moved to suppress the drug evidence, arguing that police violated his Fourth Amendment rights by attaching a GPS tracking device to his vehicle without a warrant and using the resulting data to conduct a traffic stop and search. The district court denied the motion after finding that officers placed the device on the car while it was parked in public, tracked its movements only on public roads for about three weeks, and relied on the GPS data along with other observations to justify the stop and a subsequent canine sniff that alerted to narcotics. The court reasoned that Supreme Court precedent in United States v. Knotts established that monitoring a vehicle's travel on public streets does not constitute a search, even though it acknowledged contrary reasoning in United States v. Maynard and noted that South Carolina law provided a mechanism for obtaining a tracking warrant. The ruling followed Knotts as binding authority rather than extending privacy protections to prolonged GPS surveillance.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In Goode v. Astrue, the plaintiff challenged the Social Security Administration's denial of his application for disability insurance benefits, after an ALJ found that his impairments including coronary artery disease did not meet a listed impairment and that he could perform other work. The district court had previously remanded the case for further explanation by the ALJ but declined to award benefits outright. Plaintiff then sought attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, which the court denied. The court reasoned that the government's position was substantially justified because the ALJ had relied on the plaintiff's own statements about performing household chores and caring for a child to conclude he did not have serious limitations in daily activities, providing a reasonable basis in both fact and law even though additional explanation was required.

federal powerhealthcareprocedure

In Gossett v. McMurtry, the plaintiff sued the defendants for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and defamation after an incident during a fishing trip where he was pranked and photographs were taken and shared. The plaintiff sought to invoke the court's admiralty jurisdiction and strike the defendant's jury trial demand. The court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the incident did not satisfy the location and connection tests for admiralty jurisdiction over tort claims, as the publication occurred on land and the prank lacked potential to disrupt maritime commerce or a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. There was no other basis for federal jurisdiction.

proceduretorts & liabilityfederal power

In this case, Joseph Sherby sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Social Security Commissioner's partial denial of his Disability Insurance Benefits claim, based on a back injury and spinal surgery that allegedly prevented work starting in 2003. An ALJ determined Sherby was disabled from September 2003 to July 2006 but found medical improvement thereafter allowing light work, leading to denial of ongoing benefits; the Appeals Council upheld this. The Magistrate Judge recommended reversal and remand, concluding the ALJ improperly relied only on the medical-vocational guidelines at step five despite nonexertional limitations from pain affecting concentration, which required vocational expert testimony instead. The district court adopted this recommendation, reversed the Commissioner's decision, and remanded for further proceedings, also noting a subsequent disability finding but declining to address additional objections as moot.

federal powerhealthcare

The case involved plaintiff Daryl Figueroa challenging his disqualification from a Customs and Border Protection officer position due to an age limit of 37, claiming it violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act after he applied as a veteran preference eligible. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, adopting the magistrate judge's recommendation. It held that 5 U.S.C. § 3307 expressly authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to set maximum entry ages for such positions, exempting the policy from ADEA coverage, and that the court lacked jurisdiction over any embedded VEOA claim because the plaintiff had not exhausted required administrative remedies under that statute. The dismissal was with prejudice as to the ADEA claim but without prejudice to separate VEOA or USERRA claims.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In this case, the plaintiff sought judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner's denial of disability benefits and, after prevailing on remand, moved for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act for work by three attorneys. The defendant did not object to the local attorney's fees or to a later request under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) but opposed fees for the two out-of-state attorneys who had not applied for pro hac vice admission. The court awarded $821.22 to the local counsel but denied fees for the out-of-state attorneys, reasoning that special circumstances under the EAJA made the award unjust because those attorneys had repeatedly been warned by judges in the district to seek admission yet continued to sign briefs and perform the majority of the work without being licensed to practice in South Carolina.

procedure

In Williams v. Ozmint, an inmate at Ridgeland Correctional Institution sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after being required to wear a pink jumpsuit for one year following his second conviction for public masturbation under South Carolina Department of Corrections policy. He claimed violations of equal protection because inmates committing other level-three or more serious offenses did not face the same requirement, as well as Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment and due process issues arising from associated restrictions on meals, work, religious activities, library access, and gym use. The court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, adopting the magistrate judge's recommendation after de novo review. It held that the policy was rationally related to legitimate penological interests such as deterrence and did not constitute disparate treatment or create a substantial risk of serious harm, and that the plaintiff had received all required due process at his disciplinary hearing.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

This case involved a claim for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income under the Social Security Act, where the claimant alleged disability starting in 2003 due to conditions including back pain, diabetes, and carpal tunnel syndrome. After the ALJ denied benefits and the Appeals Council affirmed, the claimant's representative sought judicial review in federal court. The Magistrate Judge recommended reversing the Commissioner's decision and awarding benefits, finding the ALJ had not properly weighed treating physicians' opinions, assessed residual functional capacity, or evaluated credibility. The District Court adopted the recommendation in full, holding that the ALJ's decision lacked substantial evidence and that further record development was unnecessary under Fourth Circuit precedent.

federal powerhealthcare

The case involves Maurice Graves's pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his 2003 South Carolina conviction for first-degree burglary and resulting life sentence without parole, based on claims including ineffective assistance of counsel for lack of pre-trial consultation and other constitutional challenges to the statute and proceedings. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation after reviewing the full record and objections, denying Graves's motion to voluntarily withdraw the petition, granting the respondent's motion for summary judgment, and dismissing the habeas petition. The court found that the magistrate judge had accurately summarized the facts and applied the correct legal principles. It granted a certificate of appealability limited to the question of whether the entire pre-trial period constitutes a critical stage under United States v. Cronic warranting a presumption of prejudice.

criminal lawprocedure

Larry Kevin Goode sued the Social Security Commissioner under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking review of the denial of his application for SSI disability benefits. The court adopted the magistrate judge's finding that the ALJ had failed to properly analyze all relevant medical evidence and explain the weight given to exhibits concerning the claimant's daily activities and impairments. The court therefore reversed the Commissioner's decision as not supported by substantial evidence. However, it declined to award benefits outright and instead remanded the case for further administrative proceedings to allow a complete evaluation of the record.

federal power

In Thomas v. Eagleton, a state prisoner filed a pro se federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his 2004 guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter, for which he received a 20-year sentence. The petitioner argued that prescription medications rendered him incompetent to plead guilty, that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate his medications or pursue a self-defense claim, and related claims of an involuntary plea. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, granting the state's motion for summary judgment and dismissing the petition. The court held that one claim was procedurally defaulted, while the remaining claims failed because the state post-conviction court's findings—that the petitioner was competent and counsel was not ineffective—were neither contrary to clearly established federal law nor based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned defendant Franklin Joe White's motion to suppress a .22 caliber rifle seized from his residence during a warrantless search following his arrest outside the home in connection with a reported domestic violence incident involving a gun. Officers responded to a 911 call about a woman being held against her will, entered the mobile home after arresting the defendant to conduct a protective sweep for other occupants and the missing firearm, and located the rifle behind the couch after obtaining consent to search from the defendant's mother. The court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the mother's consent was voluntary and credible, that the protective sweep was supported by specific and articulable facts warranting the intrusion, and that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The court also noted that the scope of the search was limited to the area behind the couch as indicated by the victim.

criminal lawprocedureguns

This case involved a dispute between Coastal Roofing Company and subcontractors over the termination of a contract for roofing work at a U.S. Navy facility, including claims under the Miller Act, quantum meruit, fraud, and civil conspiracy, as well as counterclaims for breach of contract and negligence. After the court stayed litigation and compelled arbitration pursuant to the contract, an arbitrator awarded defendants over $742,000. Coastal moved to vacate the award while defendants sought confirmation. The court denied the motion to vacate and confirmed the award, applying the narrow standard of review under the Federal Arbitration Act that limits judicial intervention to cases where the arbitrator exceeded authority or manifestly disregarded the law.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Ray v. Bowers, a former College of Charleston student sued the college under Title IX after alleging sexual harassment by her professor, Bowers, during the fall 2006 semester, including an unwanted relationship and harassing messages; she had not reported any issues until after receiving her grade. The court granted the college's motion for summary judgment on the Title IX claim. The core reasoning was that the college lacked actual knowledge of the specific harassment until the plaintiff's January 2007 report, after which it immediately investigated, preserved evidence, and discharged the professor while providing additional support to the student.

civil rightsprocedure

The case involved a pro se habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by Ronald Donald Dingle, who had pleaded guilty in 1995 to South Carolina charges including murder, burglary, and others in exchange for parole eligibility after thirty years and immunity from the death penalty. After a state post-conviction relief order led to resentencing rather than a new trial, Dingle argued he was not receiving the benefit of his plea bargain due to parole ineligibility and the later invalidation of the juvenile death penalty. The district court declined to adopt the magistrate's recommendation to dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies but dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim, holding that the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision upholding the resentencing was not contrary to clearly established federal law and that Dingle was now parole-eligible as agreed.

criminal lawprocedure

This case arose after a chemical spill at a Charleston port terminal when a chassis collapsed under a container, leading St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance to pay cleanup costs as the insurer for the stevedore and then sue Yang Ming, a slot charterer that had used the chassis. After settling with St. Paul, Yang Ming sought contractual or equitable indemnification from Cosco, the owner of the allegedly defective chassis, under the South Atlantic Chassis Program Operating Agreement that pooled chassis among contributors. The court granted Cosco’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that the agreement’s primary indemnification clause placed responsibility on the chassis user rather than the owner, that a secondary clause for owners did not apply here, and that no equitable indemnification was warranted given the parties’ contractual arrangement. The decision rested on straightforward contract interpretation under South Carolina law, which gives effect to the plain language without adding unexpressed terms, along with Yang Ming’s failure to oppose the equitable claim.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

State Farm Fire and Casualty Company filed a declaratory judgment action in federal court against John Singleton and Dorchester County School District Two (DCSD2) to determine its obligations under a homeowner's insurance policy for a lawsuit brought by Brandon Bivens against Singleton and DCSD2 in state court over an alleged injury. DCSD2 moved to dismiss the action against it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming no case or controversy existed between it and State Farm. The court granted the motion, holding that DCSD2 was not a party to the insurance contract and had only a contingent interest in the coverage determination, which did not satisfy the Article III requirement of an actual controversy between adverse parties.

procedure

In Cherochak v. Unum Life Insurance Co. of America, the plaintiff sought to alter or amend the court's prior judgment dismissing his claims and to further amend his complaint to add state law claims for fraud and related torts, all arising from the defendant's handling of his long-term disability benefits claim under a policy governed by ERISA and a related Regulatory Settlement Agreement (RSA). The court denied both motions. The plaintiff had conceded that his breach of contract and declaratory judgment claims based on the RSA were preempted by ERISA under 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), and the court found that the claims related directly to the ERISA plan because determining any breach would require reference to the plan's terms. The court similarly held that the proposed state law amendments would be preempted by ERISA for the same reasons.

healthcarefederal powerbusiness & regulatory

This case involved plaintiffs who alleged they contracted Legionnaires’ disease from bacteria at a Sheraton hotel during a 2005 reunion and sued Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc. and The Sheraton, LLC on theories of direct negligence and vicarious liability based on actual or apparent agency. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing they neither owned nor operated the hotel after 2003, when Main Street acquired it and Soleil Group later managed it under franchise agreements. The court granted the motion, holding that the plaintiffs could not establish direct liability because the franchisors lacked day-to-day control, nor actual agency because the license and reservations agreements did not create a principal-agent relationship, nor apparent agency because multiple disclosures informed guests of the hotel’s independent ownership. Applying South Carolina negligence law, the court found no genuine issue of material fact on any theory of liability.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory