AI-measured from their own opinions — each lever cites its cases
PurposivismTextualism
Opinions apply ERISA and Texas insurance statutes by their plain terms, refusing to expand remedies or allow fiduciary claims when a direct benefits action exists under the statute. Barrack v. Unum American Life In… ↗
Willing to revisit precedentStrong stare decisis
Texas malpractice precedent barring claims based on an unoverturned criminal conviction is applied without qualification or reexamination. Martinez Alvarez v. Casita Maria… ↗
Deference to government powerSkepticism of government power
In this ERISA case, the plaintiff sued the Excel Plan for wrongful denial of additional life insurance benefits following her husband's death, alleging he had increased his coverage during open enrollment. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss in part, specifically regarding the applicable standard of review (abuse of discretion) and limitations on evidence, but denied it as to other matters, allowing the benefits claim to proceed. The court denied the plaintiff's request to amend her complaint to add a breach of fiduciary duty claim, reasoning that such a claim is unavailable when the plaintiff already has a cause of action for denied benefits under ERISA section 1132(a)(1)(B). Various procedural motions were also resolved, including striking an untimely sur-reply.
The case involved a plaintiff suing his employer in state court for age and disability discrimination under Texas law. The defendant removed the action to federal court on the basis that the plaintiff's attached EEOC complaint referenced federal law violations, creating federal question jurisdiction. The court granted the plaintiff's motion to remand, ruling that the plaintiff is master of his complaint and did not assert any federal claims, so the EEOC attachment alone did not establish federal jurisdiction. Removal jurisdiction must be strictly construed with doubts resolved against removal, and the artful pleading doctrine did not apply. The motion to amend the complaint was denied as moot, and the case was remanded to state court.
In Roberson v. Game Stop, Inc., the plaintiff, an African American employee in the Return to Vendor department, alleged that after taking FMLA leave in 2002 she was demoted and replaced by a white co-lead, later faced a pay cut along with the co-lead, and was ultimately terminated when her FMLA leave expired; she claimed racial discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, FMLA violations, and retaliation under Title VII and the Texas Worker’s Compensation Act. The court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on all claims. The core reasoning was that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination because she did not show she was replaced by or treated less favorably than a less-qualified white employee, nor denied consideration for other available positions due to race; she also did not present evidence that the employer’s stated reasons were pretextual or that she was denied FMLA benefits or retaliated against for filing a workers’ compensation claim.
The case involved plaintiff Jan Bergen, a long-time employee at Continental Casualty Company, who sued after her 2003 termination, alleging discrimination on the basis of sex, age, and disability under federal and state law as well as retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim and complaining about performance ratings. The district court considered the defendant's motion for summary judgment along with related procedural motions. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant, holding that the plaintiff failed to establish prima facie cases for her discrimination and retaliation claims or to show that the employer's stated reason of poor performance was pretextual. The undisputed facts showed repeated performance deficiencies and a legitimate file-audit process leading to termination, with no sufficient evidence of discriminatory or retaliatory motive under the applicable burden-shifting frameworks.
In this case, a federal TSA security screener and his union sued the government under the Little Tucker Act, alleging breach of contract and Fifth Amendment violations after the employee was not paid the salary stated in his conditional appointment letter. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. It held that federal employment arises from appointment rather than contract unless the governing statute or hiring documents explicitly create a contractual relationship, and the relevant TSA statutes and documents here did not. Because no contract existed, the Little Tucker Act provided no jurisdiction over the breach claim, and the constitutional claims likewise failed for lack of jurisdiction or a viable cause of action. The complaint was dismissed with prejudice.
The case concerns Matt Bourgault, a traveling Christian evangelist, who was denied permission to preach and distribute pamphlets on the University of Texas at Arlington campus because he was an off-campus speaker not affiliated with the university or sponsored by a registered student organization. University policies, including Board of Regents' Rules 6.1, 6.2, and 6.71, and the UTA Off-Campus Speakers policy, restricted such activities by non-students and prohibited religious evangelism or witnessing. Bourgault sought a preliminary injunction to bar enforcement of these rules on First Amendment grounds. The court denied the motion, finding that Bourgault failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits or the other required factors for injunctive relief under Fifth Circuit precedent.